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Collective conflicts among humans are widespread, although
often highly destructive. A classic explanation for the prevalence
of such warfare in some human societies is leadership by self-
serving individuals that reap the benefits of conflict while other
members of society pay the costs. Here, we show that leadership
of this kind can also explain the evolution of collective violence in
certain animal societies. We first extend the classic hawk−dove
model of the evolution of animal aggression to consider cases in
which a subset of individuals within each group may initiate fights
in which all group members become involved. We show that lead-
ership of this kind, when combined with inequalities in the payoffs
of fighting, can lead to the evolution of severe intergroup aggres-
sion, with negative consequences for population mean fitness. We
test our model using long-term data from wild banded mon-
gooses, a species characterized by frequent intergroup conflicts
that have very different fitness consequences for male and female
group members. The data show that aggressive encounters be-
tween groups are initiated by females, who gain fitness benefits
from mating with extragroup males in the midst of battle, whereas
the costs of fighting are borne chiefly by males. In line with the
model predictions, the result is unusually severe levels of inter-
group violence. Our findings suggest that the decoupling of leaders
from the costs that they incite amplifies the destructive nature of
intergroup conflict.
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Humans are capable of astonishing feats of altruism and co-operation (1–3), but, at the same time, of violent and de-
structive conflicts (4–8). A key factor contributing to the latter
may be that wars are often waged at the behest of leaders who do
not share fully in the immediate risks of conflict, and stand to
gain benefits in terms of resources and status that are not enjoyed by
the majority of combatants (4, 9–11). Could such “warmongering” be
a feature of animal conflicts too? Only recently have models of an-
imal aggression begun to explore the impact of inequalities among
combatants in collective conflict (12, 13), and the usual assumption
of existing theory is that individuals who initiate intergroup conflicts
also contribute most to group conflict effort and thereby confer fit-
ness benefits on the rest of their group (a positive or “heroic” model
of leadership) (14–17). Here, we explore the more sinister possi-
bility that those who initiate conflict may actually harm their fel-
lows in pursuit of their own interests by exposing them to the risks
of conflict while contributing little to fighting themselves (a neg-
ative or “exploitative” model of leadership).
The Model
In the classic hawk−dove game (18), members of a population
engage in pairwise antagonistic interactions, with each individual
choosing whether to adopt aggressive (hawk) or peaceful (dove)
tactics. We extend this model to consider pairwise encounters
between groups of size n (assuming that each individual engages
in an average of n group interactions, so that the number of
encounters per individual remains the same as in the original
game). In each encounter, individuals are grouped at random,
and one member of each group (chosen at random) becomes the
“leader,” while the rest become “followers.” A group may col-
lectively adopt aggressive (hawk) or peaceful (dove) tactics, with
the leader making this decision for the group via their dispro-
portionate influence on collective behavior (19). Thus our model
applies to cohesive groups in which there are costs to individuals
that do not follow the tactic chosen by the leader, for example,
because refuseniks are punished (20, 21) or forego the benefits
of group membership (22, 23). In human societies, leaders can
embroil other group members in conflict by wielding political
influence, including peer pressure and the use of threats to co-
erce other group members to fight (10, 24–27). Societies in which
warriors follow orders given by their leaders [i.e., exhibiting a
high degree of “subordination” (9)] are common in the ethno-
graphic record [27 out of 36 societies in one cross-cultural
sample (9)]. In mobile animal groups, leaders are individuals
that wield disproportionate influence over collective movement
(19, 28), which may enable them to draw or coerce their fol-
lowers into antagonistic encounters with other groups that ben-
efit themselves but not necessarily the rest of the group. Total
fitness payoffs to contending groups in our model are identical to
the payoffs to individuals in the classic game (see Materials and
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Methods), but while, in the simplest case, all benefits and costs
are divided equally among group members, we allow for unequal
sharing [or “political bias” (26)]. Formally, we suppose that each
follower’s share of any benefit obtained is reduced by a pro-
portion dv compared to that of the leader, while the leader’s
share of any costs incurred is reduced by a proportion dc com-
pared to that of a follower.
In the original (pairwise interaction) game, when the fitness
cost of losing a fight (c) is no greater than the value of victory (v),
the model yields an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in which
all individuals play hawk. Consequently, over this range, all en-
counters involve fighting, and the expected mean payoff de-
creases with the cost of losing, reaching a minimum of zero when
c = v. As the cost of losing increases further, however, the evo-
lutionarily stable probability of playing hawk starts to decrease,
so that fights become rarer (Fig. 1). The expected mean payoff
thus increases once again, despite the fact that each individual
fight is more damaging to the loser. For no value of c does the
mean payoff fall below zero. In the group conflict game, by
contrast, the probability of playing hawk is equal to 1 for cL < vL
and to vL/cL for cL > vL, where vL denotes the individual benefit
gained by the leader of a victorious group and cL denotes the
individual cost incurred by the leader of a defeated group. Thus,
when leaders gain a disproportionately large share of the benefits
of conflict (dv > 0; Fig. 1, A, C, and E) and/or pay a dispropor-
tionately small share of the costs (dc > 0; Fig. 1, B, D, and F),
hawk continues to be played with probability 1, and the mean
fitness payoff continues to decline, even as the total cost of losing
a fight c rises above the total value of the benefit of winning v
(Fig. 1 A and B). This leads to mean fitness payoffs at equilib-
rium that are negative for part of the parameter space of the
model (Fig. 1 C and D). The greater the inequality in the division
of costs and benefits within groups (i.e., the larger the values of
dv and dc), the greater the potential negative impact of conflict.
These conclusions, moreover, are unaffected by the introduction
into the model of persistent groups (associating always with the
same group mates in every encounter), and consistent leaders
(where the same individual within a group always leads; see SI
Appendix for details of the extended model).
The exploitative nature of leadership in the above model is
highlighted in Fig. 1 E and F, which contrasts the mean payoff to
followers per encounter when leaders control group behavior
(solid curves) with the potential maximum payoff obtainable if a
follower were to seize control of the group and impose its own
preferred choice of behavior (dotted line). When the benefits of
victory outweigh the costs of losing even for followers (i.e., when
vF > cF), then all group members favor the hawk tactic, and the
interests of followers coincide with those of leaders. But, over a
large part of the model’s parameter space (when cF > vF), followers
favor a lower frequency of hawk than do leaders and, due to this
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Fig. 1. (A and B) Evolutionarily stable probabilities of escalated fighting and (C and D) mean payoffs per individual across all encounters, as a function of the
total cost c of losing a fight (expressed relative to the value of victory v, and plotted on a log scale), in the original pairwise-interaction hawk−dove game
(blue curves), and in the group-interaction game (red curves). A and C show results when leaders claim a disproportionately large share of the benefits of
victory, that is, when dv > 0 (solid red curves, dv = 0.25; dotted red curves, dv = 0.5; dashed red curves dv = 0.75; dc = 0 in each case); B and D show results when
leaders suffer a disproportionately small share of the cost of losing a fight, that is, when dc > 0 (solid red curves, dc = 0.25; dotted red curves, dc = 0.5; dashed
red curves dc = 0.75; dv = 0 in each case). In all cases, n = 5. (E and F) Mean payoffs to followers per encounter when leaders control group behavior (solid
curves), compared to the potential maximum payoffs obtainable if a follower were to seize control of the group and impose its own preferred behavior
(dashed curves), as a function of the total cost c of losing a fight (expressed relative to the value of victory v, and plotted on a log scale). Exploitative
leadership occurs where the solid and dashed curves diverge. Parameter values E, (dv = 0.5, dc = 0, n = 5); F, (dv = 0, dc = 0.5, n = 5).


































potentially do if they were able to seize control for themselves and
impose their own preferred choice of group behavior.
Results and Discussion
We tested whether this model could help to explain patterns of
intergroup aggression, using data from an obligately social
mammal, the banded mongoose (Mungos mungo). This species
lives in highly territorial, mixed-sex groups averaging ∼20 adults
plus offspring (29). Group members forage and sleep together in
an underground burrow, and cooperate to rear young and to
defend against aerial and terrestrial predators (30). Group
members never leave the group unless they are forcibly expelled
as a same-sex group (31) or, more rarely, leave voluntarily as a
same-sex group (32). Exploitative leadership is plausible in ob-
ligately social, group-foraging species because followers may
have little option but to remain as part of the group, even when
the self-serving decisions of their leaders place them at personal
risk. In obligately social species, individuals that leave the group
forego the survival and fitness benefits of group living (22), and
may suffer reduced body condition (33) and elevated stress (34),
and are at increased risk of predation (35) and/or attack by
groups of conspecifics (36).
Reproduction in banded mongooses is synchronized within but
not between groups (29). Multiple females in each group give
birth together on the same day in an underground den, and
offspring are raised cooperatively by the whole group. All adult
female group members enter estrus within 7 d to 10 d of one
another (the “group estrus” period), during which females are
closely guarded by males from their own group (29). The adult
sex ratio is significantly male biased [1.6 males:females (29)], and
males compete intensely for access to females in their own group
and in rival groups. Throughout group estrus, mate-guarding
males follow females of their own group nose-to-tail all day
long, and aggressively defend them from other males in their
own group. Encounters between groups are frequent [0.6 to 3
per month (37)] and always aggressive (e.g., 95/95 interactions in
ref. 38), usually escalating into chases and physical combat (see
Materials and Methods). When members of rival groups detect
each other, they stand up and emit a piercing call which brings
the group running together into a tight formation. Bunched
groups often advance toward one another in tight “battle lines”
which may function to assess relative group resource holding
potential; these face-offs erupt into individual fights and chases
that involve biting and scratching (Fig. 2A and Movies S1–S3). In
the midst of these encounters, individual mongooses may be-
come separated from their group and attacked on all sides
(Movie S1), leading to injury and sometimes death (37, 38).
The model predicts that damaging levels of intergroup ag-
gression can evolve where a subset of group members can initiate
conflicts that involve the whole group, and where the initiators of
conflicts gain a disproportionate benefit or suffer lower costs
from fighting than do others. To test this prediction in banded
mongooses, we focused on sex differences in the payoffs of in-
tergroup conflict, because, as we describe below, females and
males may have different fitness interests in intergroup interac-
tions (IGIs). We asked three questions: 1) Do males and females
experience different costs and/or benefits of IGIs? 2) Does the
sex that experiences the lowest costs and/or highest benefits of
IGIs initiate the encounters? 3) Is the result unusually severe
levels of intergroup violence (measured in terms of the mortality
costs of IGIs)?
Fitness Costs and Benefits of IGIs
First, to evaluate sex differences in the costs of IGIs, we analyzed
all of the adult deaths attributable to intergroup fighting over a
16-y period. We found that almost all mortality attributable to
fighting occurred in males. Females, by contrast, almost never died
in, or as a result of, fighting (generalized linear model [GLM], β ±
SE = 1.63 ± 0.80, χ21 = 5.62, P = 0.018; Fig. 2B). This result is
consistent with a previous study using staged encounters, which
found that males are highly aggressive toward experimental in-
truders, while females remain nonaggressive (38).
To evaluate fitness benefits to males and females of engaging
in IGIs, we examined how the lifetime number of extragroup
offspring (LEGO), and lifetime reproductive success (LRS)
varied with the number of IGIs experienced across the lifetime
(Fig. 2C). This analysis used genetic pedigree data on 499 adult
males and 367 adult females for which genetic data are available
across the entire lifespan. Both LEGO and LRS increased more
steeply with the number of IGIs in females compared to males
(GLM, sex * number of IGIs interaction: LEGO β ±
SE = −0.014 ± 0.005, χ22 = 8.77, P = 0.012; LRS β ±
SE = −0.008 ± 0.003, χ22 = 7.43, P = 0.024). This result held
when we included lifespan as an offset, suggesting that the rate of
production of surviving offspring (both extragroup and all off-
spring) increased more steeply with number of IGIs in females
than males (GLM, sex * number of IGIs interaction with offset:
LEGO β ± SE = −0.014 ± 0.006, χ22 = 18.74, P < 0.001; LRS β ±
SE = −0.009 ± 0.004, χ22 = 6.34, P = 0.042). The true fitness
benefits of IGIs to females are likely to be even greater than this
relationship suggests, because extragroup offspring are more
heterozygous, heavier, and have higher survival compared to
pups fathered within the group (39).
These analyses suggest that not only do females suffer lower
mortality costs from IGIs than males, but they also gain greater
fitness benefits. In these circumstances, our model predicts fe-
males, as a class, should prefer a higher rate of IGI than males
(Fig. 1 E and F). If they can exert disproportionate control over
group movement, females are predicted to lead their groups into
intergroup encounters that are beneficial for themselves but not
for the males in their group.
Initiators of IGIs
Because encounters between banded mongoose groups always
involve aggression (38), individuals with disproportionate influ-
ence on group movement can initiate intergroup aggression by
leading their group into detection range of a rival group. Several
lines of evidence suggest that females lead their groups into IGIs
to gain access to extragroup matings. First, reproductive females
exert disproportionate influence on group leadership decisions
compared to males (40), particularly during the “group estrus”
period when mate-guarding males follow estrus females
nose-to-tail all day long, for days at a time (41). Estrus females
have been observed to lead their group deep into enemy terri-
tory, closely followed by mate-guarding males, directly inciting
intergroup fights. In the ensuing chaos, females escape their
mate guards and mate with males from the rival group (38).
Second, IGIs are most common when females are in estrus,
compared to when they are pregnant or in nonbreeding periods
(37). Third, genetic analysis shows that the probability that fe-
males conceive to extragroup males is significantly higher when
there is a high risk of inbreeding within their own group (39).
Fourth, as our data show, females stand to gain substantial fit-
ness benefits from IGIs through increased production of
extragroup offspring (Fig. 2).
To test more explicitly whether females are the primary initi-
ators of IGIs, we carried out a further analysis of our long-term
data, examining how the IGI rate of focal groups varied with
their own group estrus state (focal estrus [FE] vs. focal nonestrus
[FNE]) and with the group estrus state of rival groups (rival estrus
[RE] vs. rival nonestrus [RNE]). If females control the rate of
IGIs, and seek matings with rival groups when it is in their interest
to do so, we predict a higher interaction rate when those females
are in group estrus (and therefore most likely to conceive), irre-
spective of the group estrus state of rival groups. By contrast, if
males control the IGI rate, we predict lower encounter rates when








































females in their own group are in estrus, because males closely
mate guard females in their own group throughout the group
estrus period. Consistent with the hypothesis that females initiate
IGIs, encounter rates increased when females were in group es-
trus, irrespective of the group estrus state of rival groups (gener-
alized linear mixed model [GLMM]: χ23 = 17.86, P < 0.001; post
hoc Tukey’s test: FERNE vs. FNERNE: β ± SE = 0.84 ± 0.22, z =
3.76, P < 0.001; FERE vs. FNERNE: β ± SE = 1.27 ± 0.35, z = 3.64,
P = 0.001; all other pairwise comparisons P > 0.1; Fig. 3).
These findings, together with our observations (37, 38) and
genetic data (39), suggest that IGIs are driven by estrus females
who lead their group in search of outbred matings, and use the
cover of battle to escape reproductive control by their mate
guards. Once females have initiated a conflict by leading their
group into detection range of another, males on the opposing
side attempt to drive off mate guards to gain access to guarded
females, and mate-guarding males have little option but to fight
rival males to defend access to their estrus females. In the chaos
and confusion, females can escape their mate guards and mate
with males from the rival group (Movie S2).
Mortality due to Intergroup Conflict in Other Species
Finally, to assess whether the severity of intergroup aggression is
unusually high in banded mongooses, we compared rates of adult
death attributable to intergroup fighting with other mammals for
which comparable data exist. One way to quantify the severity of
conflict is to calculate the proportion of deaths of known cause
that are attributable to intergroup aggression. In the vast ma-
jority of social mammals, lethal intergroup conflict is absent or
extremely rare (36, 42–44). Frequent, lethal coalitionary vio-
lence, accounting for 10% more of adult deaths, is probably
limited to 10 or fewer mammalian species (45). In banded
mongooses, IGIs account for 10% of total adult mortality where
the cause of death is known; for juveniles, this figure is 20% (39).
In wolves (Canis lupus), relations between packs are highly ag-
gressive, and, in some populations, intraspecific (presumed in-
tergroup) killing accounts for 43% (46) to 71% (47) of adult
deaths of known cause. In one well-studied lion population, a
large majority of adult deaths are a consequence, directly or
indirectly, of intergroup aggression (48). In chimpanzees, rates of
intergroup (or intercommunity) killing vary widely across pop-
ulations (49, 50), but accounted for 17% of adult deaths in one
long-term study (51). In humans, the percentage of adult mor-
tality that is attributable to war averaged 14% for 14 Late
Pleistocene and Early Holocene hunter-gatherers [mean across
14 sites, range 0 to 30% (52)], and 18% in 14 contemporary
small-scale human societies [mean across 14 societies, range 0 to
33% (52, 53)].
For three species (in addition to banded mongooses), suffi-
cient information was available on the number of deaths and
A C
B
Fig. 2. (A) Banded mongoose battle lines during an IGI. Image credit: Dave Seager (photographer). (B) Costs of intergroup aggression in male and female
banded mongooses. Mortality rate of adult (>1 y) males and females resulting from intergroup aggression. Box, median and interquartile range; whisker,
90th percentile; points, outliers. *P = 0.018. N = 478 males, 335 females followed for 1,899 mongoose-years. (C) LRS and intergroup conflict. LEGO (Top) and
LRS (Bottom) of males (blue) and females (orange) are plotted against the number of IGIs in which individuals were involved across their lifespan. Data are for
499 males and 367 female adults monitored from birth to death over 20 y.


































periods of exposure to calculate annual total adult mortality
attributable to intergroup violence: humans, represented by
small-scale human societies (subsistence hunter-gatherers [N =
12 societies] and farmers [n = 21 societies (5)]), chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) (54), and another intensely studied social
mongoose, the meerkat (Suricata suricatta) (55), using data that
we extracted from the long-term database. Banded mongooses
exhibit very high levels of annual mortality from intergroup
conflict (“intergroup mortality”) compared to meerkats, showing
that such high mortality is not a peculiarity of social mongooses.
In meerkats, breeding females typically have access to an unre-
lated in-group male, and so have little or no incentive to pursue
matings with rival groups. Only around 3% of meerkat pups are
fathered by extragroup males (56), compared to 18% of pups in
banded mongooses (57). Dominant female meerkats exert dis-
proportionate influence over some aspects of group movement
(e.g., selection of sleeping burrows), but use this control to avoid
rather than pursue interaction with other groups (58). The mean
intergroup mortality rate in banded mongooses (0.4% per
annum) is greater than that observed in chimpanzees, and
comparable to the rate of death observed in small-scale human
societies (Fig. 4). These data, and the data on proportional
causes of death, confirm that intergroup conflict in banded
mongooses is extremely damaging, involving mortality costs that
are comparable to those seen in the most warlike mammals.
Conclusions
In sum, our results suggest that banded mongooses experience
high levels of mortality from intergroup conflict because en-
counters are initiated by females to gain genetic benefits, while
males bear the cost of collective aggression. Estrus females incite
fights among rival groups as a means to acquire a fitness benefit
that they could not otherwise obtain, and mate-guarding males
are forced into conflicts that it is not in their interests to seek out.
The result is an unusually high level of intergroup violence and
mortality. These findings do not fit a heroic model of leadership,
in which leaders contribute most to aggression and bear greater
costs, but rather an exploitative model, in which the initiators of
conflict expose others to greater risks while contributing little to
fighting themselves. As our model shows, this type of inequality
can favor the evolution of increased aggression in collective
animal conflicts, even to a point at which mean per capita payoffs
are negative (such that groups would be better off if the potential
benefits that they fight to obtain never existed in the first place).
Since unequal division of costs and benefits is also a feature of
complex warfare in humans (59), it is possible that similar pro-
cesses could contribute to the destructive nature of human
warfare. Consequently, while there are many ecological and so-
cial factors that may have shaped patterns of human intergroup
violence [including kinship, subsistence strategy, military tech-
nology, and systems of political organization (11, 60, 61)], our
findings highlight the value of exploring when and how leaders
may become decoupled from the costs that they incite.
Materials and Methods
All research procedures received prior approval from Uganda Wildlife Au-
thority and Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, and ad-
hered to the Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioural Research
and Teaching, published by the Association for the Study of Animal Be-
haviour. All research was approved by the Ethical Review Committee of the
University of Exeter.
The Model. In the classic hawk−dove game (18), members of a population
contest engage in pairwise agonistic interactions, with each individual
choosing whether to adopt aggressive (hawk) or peaceful (dove) tactics. An
individual that plays hawk always defeats one that plays dove, the former
obtaining a payoff v and the latter a payoff of zero; two doves resolve their
encounter peacefully, or each have equal probabilities of winning, so that
each obtains an expected payoff of v/2; lastly, two hawks become embroiled
in an escalated conflict that each is equally likely to win, the winner
obtaining a payoff of v while the loser suffers a cost c, so that each indi-
vidual obtains an expected payoff of (v – c)/2.
In the group conflict game, each encounter involves two randomly as-
sembled groups of size n (≥2), in each of which a single (randomly selected)
individual acts as leader, choosing whether its group will collectively adopt
hawk or dove tactics. We assume that there is one such encounter per pair of
Fig. 3. Intergroup encounters and female reproductive state. The number
of IGIs observed per day when a focal and rival group were in each of four
possible combined group estrus (es) states. Points show means from the
GLMM ± SE; ***P < 0.001; **P = 0.001; asterisks refer to post hoc Tukey’s all-
pairwise comparison of means across all four categories.
Fig. 4. Comparable mortality costs of intergroup aggression. Adult mor-
tality rate from intergroup aggression in chimpanzees P. troglodytes (N = 5
populations studied for >5 y), small-scale human societies (N = 12 hunter-
gatherers and N = 20 subsistence farmer societies), meerkats (N = 24 groups
studied for >5 y), and banded mongooses (N = 10 groups studied for >5 y).
Box, median and IQR; whisker, 90th percentile; points, outliers. Human and
nonhuman primate data are redrawn from ref. 54.








































individuals in the population (as in the original, pairwise interaction game),
so that each individual engages in an average of n group contests. The total
payoffs to contending groups are identical to the payoffs to individuals in
the pairwise game. In the simplest case, any benefits obtained by a group
are divided equally among its members, as are any costs incurred through
escalated conflict. Allowing for inequality, however, we suppose that each
follower’s share of any benefits gained is reduced by a proportion dv com-
pared to that of the leader, while the leader’s share of any costs incurred is
reduced by a proportion dc compared to that of a follower. The leader’s
share vL of the collective payoff of victory is thus equal to v/(n – (n – 1) dv),
while each follower’s share vF is equal to v (1 – dv)/(n – (n – 1) dv). Similarly,
the leader’s share cL of costs incurred by a losing group is equal to c (1 – dc)/
(n – dc), while each follower’s share cF is equal to c/(n – dc).
Consider a population of individuals that (if selected as leader) play hawk
with probability p. The expected payoff in this population to a rare mutant









) + p(1 − p)vF + (1 − p)2vF2 )
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦,
where the first term in square brackets on the right-hand side represents the
payoff from the fraction (1/n) of group encounters in which the focal indi-
vidual is chosen as leader, and the second term represents the payoff from
the fraction ((n – 1)/n)) of group encounters in which the focal individual is
a follower.
We seek an evolutionarily stable probability of playing Hawk p*, which
satisfies
w(pm,p*) ≤ w(p*,p*)  for  pm ≠p*,
and if w(pm,p*) = w(p*,p*)
then w(pm,pm)<w(p*,pm)




































)2   for  cL>vL
and a mean overall payoff ofw (over the n encounters in which an individual
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.
The evolutionarily stable probability p*with which leaders play hawk differs,
over a large part of the model’s parameter range, from that which would be
favored by followers (if the latter were able to enforce their own prefer-
ences on their group). To illustrate this evolutionary conflict, we can calcu-
late the maximum payoff obtainable (in a population in which leaders adopt
the ESS) by a “rebellious” follower able to enforce its own optimal choice of
action on its group (shown in Fig. 2). This payoff, denoted w ’F, is given by
w’F = max0≤p≤1((pp*(vF − cF2 ) + p(1 − p*)vF + (1 − p)(1 − p*) vF2 )).
When cF < vF, a rebellious follower would do best always to play hawk, just
as its leader does under these circumstances, so thatw ’F = wF (i.e., there is, in
this case, no conflict between leaders and followers, and nothing for the
latter to gain even if they could seize control of their group from the
former). By contrast, when cF > vF, a rebellious follower would do best al-
ways to play dove, while its leader (following the ESS derived above) plays
hawk with some nonzero probability, so that w’F >wF (i.e., there is, in this
case, a conflict between leaders and followers, such that the latter do stand
to gain by seizing control from the former). In this second case, we refer to
the ESS outcome discussed in The Model as an instance of exploitative
leadership, since a leader, by enforcing a positive probability of playing hawk,
prevents its followers from obtaining their maximum potential payoff.
Persistent Groups and Consistent Leaders. In the above analysis, we have
adopted a classical game theoretical approach similar to that of the original
hawk−dove model, assuming a well-mixed population in which groups are
repeatedly formed at random in each encounter (so that a given individual
will be associated with different group mates in every interaction). In SI
Appendix, we consider, instead, a population in which individuals form
persistent groups (associating always with the same group mates in every
encounter), and also allow for the possibility of consistent leaders (so that
the same individual within a group always leads). As we show there, the
introduction of persistent groups does not alter the results at all, while the
addition of consistent leaders has only a very small quantitative impact that
does not affect the qualitative predictions of the model.
Study System. We collected data from a population of banded mongooses
living on theMweya Peninsula, Queen ElizabethNational Park, Uganda (0°12′
S, 29°54′E) between January 2000 and March 2019. For details of the climate
and habitat, see ref. 29. Our study population typically consists of 10 to 12
social groups occupying distinct territories (62). Groups sleep together at
night in underground dens, moving dens every 2 d to 5 d, and spend the day
foraging as a group for insects and small vertebrates. Reproduction occurs
year-round, with each group producing an average of four communal litters
per year. Around 85% of individuals are born and die in the same group
(62); among individuals that reach adulthood, ∼73% die without leaving
their natal group. When dispersal does occur, it is almost always the result of
violent eviction events targeted at young adults, particularly females (31).
Groups were visited every 1 d to 3 d to record data on group composition,
life history, and reproductive behavior. Incidences of IGIs were recorded ad
libitum during group visits. IGIs are conspicuous and aggressive, and usually
escalate into physical contact (38). Following Thompson et al. (37), we de-
fined an IGI as any occasion that two groups sighted each other and
responded by vocalizing, chasing and/or fighting. We use this definition
because interactions often involve much chasing in and out of bushes, and it
is sometimes difficult to determine whether physical contact has occurred
(37). Our dataset comprised 597 IGIs among 28 groups over a 19-y period.
Because groups are highly cohesive and mate-guarding males follow fe-
males very closely throughout the group estrus period, banded mongoose
females are able to lead other group members into intergroup encounters
that embroil the whole group (38). Upon detecting a rival group, individuals
emit specific calls (“war cries”) which alert their own group and bring them
rapidly together into a bunched formation, before advancing upon the rival
group, snarling, growling, feinting, and emitting high-pitched squeals (Fig. 2
and Movies S1–S3). Each IGI can involve multiple rounds of physical en-
counter and last for up to an hour, ending when one or both groups retreat.
Deaths and serious injury occur when individual mongooses become sepa-
rated from their group mates and are attacked on all sides (Movie S1). Most
IGIs have a clear winner and loser: Losing groups are displaced while winners
hold their ground or advance further into the rival’s territory. Group size is
an important factor contributing to group success in IGIs: in 74% of 314 IGIs
between 2000 and 2019, the larger group won the encounter and succeeded
in driving off the rival group. Further description of behavior during IGIs is
given in ref. 38.
Mortality Rates from Intergroup Conflict. Incidences where adult individuals
(older than 12 mo) died as a result of intergroup fighting (either during
intergroup fighting or as a direct result of injury) were analyzed to calculate
the rate of mortality from intergroup conflict (n = 19; 17 males and 2 fe-
males) between January 2000 and December 2015. We focus on adult
mortality since these are the data available for comparison with human
societies. We restricted our analyses to include only those groups for which
we had more than 5 y of detailed life history data (10 groups), the minimum
number of data years in Wrangham et al.’s (54) analyses of intergroup
mortality in chimpanzees. Following Wrangham et al. (54), we assembled


































data on group composition in these 10 study groups across the study period
to calculate exposure to mortality from intergroup conflict. For each adult
mongoose, we calculated the number of years that it was alive during the
study period to generate individual exposure in mongoose-years (n = 813
adults; 478 males, and 335 females). We then summed these individual ex-
posures to calculate total adult exposure for each study pack (1,899 mon-
goose-years), and also separately summed individual exposure for males
(1,171 mongoose-years) and females (728 mongoose-years). The total adult
mortality rate (% per year) from intergroup conflict in each study pack was
calculated as (D/E)*100, where D = number of adult deaths from intergroup
fighting, and E = total adult exposure in mongoose years. Mortality rates for
adult males and adult females were calculated similarly. Note that, since we
do not observe all IGIs, there may be additional deaths due to fighting that
we do not see, so the total adult intergroup mortality rate is likely to be an
underestimate.
Sex Differences in Intergroup Mortality Rate. To analyze sex differences in the
costs of collective conflict, we fitted the number of deaths observed as a result
of intergroup fighting as the response variable in a generalized linear model
with a negative binomial error structure (to account for overdispersion) and a
log-link function. Analysis was carried out using R version 3.6.0 (63) and the
“MASS” package (64). We included sex as the main term of interest, and
log(mongoose-years) as an offset term as an additional fixed effect to ac-
count for differences in exposure. To test the effect of sex on the mortality
rate from intergroup conflict, we compared the likelihood ratio of the
model with and without this fixed effect (65). We fitted the model to data
from 10 social groups.
Sex Differences in Fitness Benefits from IGIs. To analyze sex differences in the
fitness benefits obtained through IGIs, we analyzed how the LEGO and LRS
varied with the number of IGIs experienced across the lifetime. For all in-
dividuals in our population that were adults (> 1 y old) after January 2000
and for whom we had lifetime data, LEGO and LRS was calculated using
genetic pedigree data with assignment probabilities for maternity and pa-
ternity of 90% [for assignments made using a full panel of 43 microsatellites
(66)] and 95% [for assignments made using a subset of 35 microsatellites
(67)]. We fitted either LEGO or LRS as the response variable in a generalized
linear model with a zero-inflated negative binomial error structure (to ac-
count for zero inflation and overdispersion) and a log-link function using the
“glmmTMB” package (68). In each model, we included, as fixed effects, the
number of IGIs experienced as an adult across the lifetime, sex, and the in-
teraction between these variables. To test the effect of the interaction be-
tween the number of IGIs and sex on LEGO and LRS, we compared the
likelihood ratio of each model with and without this fixed effect (65). We then
repeated the analyses of LEGO and LRS to account for differences in lifespan by
including log(lifespan) as an offset term as an additional fixed effect. We fitted
each model to data from 866 individuals (499 males and 367 females).
Females as the Primary Initiators of Conflict in Banded Mongooses. For every
IGI observed between groups in our study population between January 2000
and March 2019, we assigned each group in the interacting pair as either the
focal or the rival group. In cases where one group in the interacting pair was
being observed at the time the IGI took place, this group was assigned as the
focal and the other group as the rival. In cases where both interacting groups
were being observed, or when it was not knownwhich of the two groups was
being observed, the focal and rival were assigned randomly. For each IGI
where we knew the group estrus state of the focal and rival group (n = 539
IGIs), we assigned whether the encounter occurred when focal and rival
females in the interacting pair were simultaneously in one of four estrus
states: both focal and rival females in group estrus; focal females in group
estrus but rival females not in group estrus; focal females not in group estrus
but rival females in group estrus; both focal and rival females not in group
estrus. We summed the number of IGIs occurring between each unique
focal−rival pair when in each of these four estrus states, and we also cal-
culated the total number of days that females in the pair were simulta-
neously in each of these four group estrus states.
Using the “lme4” package (65), we fitted the number of IGIs between
each focal−rival pair as the response variable in a generalized linear mixed
model with a Poisson error structure and a log-link function. We included
the group estrus state of rival and focal females as the main term of interest,
and the log(number of days in each estrus state) as an offset term as an
additional fixed effect to account for differences in the opportunity of
focal−rival pairs to interact during each group estrus state. We fitted the
focal group identity, and the rival group identity as random effects, as well
as an observation level random effect to correct overdispersion of our re-
sponse variable (69). To test the effect of group estrus state on the number
of IGIs between each focal−rival pair, we compared the likelihood ratio of
the model with and without this fixed effect (65). To determine differences
in the number of IGIs observed in each group estrus state, we conducted a
post hoc multiple comparison of means using the “glht” function with Tukey’s
all-pairwise comparisons in the “multcomp” package (70). We fitted the
model to data on 19 unique groups comprising 61 unique focal−rival pairs.
Intergroup Mortality Rates in Other Species. To assess the intensity of lethal
intergroup conflict in banded mongooses, we compared our data to that
from groups of wild chimpanzees (P. troglodytes), independent subsistence
human societies (hunter-gatherers and farmers), and meerkats (S. suricatta).
Annual intergroup mortality data from chimpanzees and humans were
taken from Wrangham et al. (54). Intergroup mortality rates for meerkats
were calculated using data from the Kalahari Meerkat Project, a long-term
behavioral study of a population of wild meerkats in the Kalahari, South
Africa (55). Individual deaths attributable to intergroup conflict between
1997 and 2016 were recorded and mortality rates for adults calculated in the
same way as for banded mongooses (n = 2,440 adults; 1,386 males and 1,054
females; individual exposures: 1,168 male meerkat-years and 964 female
meerkat-years). In meerkat groups, the dominant female is typically unre-
lated to her within-group mate, and therefore has no incentive to lead the
group on dangerous forays into neighboring territories in pursuit of out-
breeding opportunities (55). Meerkat females exert disproportionate control
over movement between sleeping burrows (58), but use this leadership
ability to avoid rather than pursue contact with rival groups. During for-
aging trips, control of group movement appears to be shared among group
members irrespective of dominance or sex (71). Thus females appear to have
no incentive to engage in exploitative leadership in meerkats, and show no
inclination to incite IGIs. Finally, while deaths from intergroup fights are
extremely rare in meerkats, they are equally likely for adult males
and females.
Data Availability. Behavioral and life history history data have been deposited
in Figshare (https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.13102586).
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